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Capital Flow Reversals, the Exchange Rate
Debate, and Dollarization
Guillermo A. Calvo and Carmen M. Reinhart
More frequent and increasingly severe crises are encouraging
emerging market economies to seek means to make themselves less
vulnerable to sudden stops in capital flows. Capital controls have
been widely discussed, but dollarization may offer a longer-term and
more market-friendly solution.
Many symptoms of impending capital market crises are common to
both developed and emerging market economies, but the similarities
end there. Developed countries have emerged relatively unscathed
from recent currency crises, such as the exchange rate mechanism
(ERM) crises of 1992-93. But emerging market economies have been
buffeted by deep and protracted crises that have been characterized by
sharp capital flow reversals and output collapses, and exacerbated by
serious banking problems.
Given the increased severity and the frequency of these crises, it is
worthwhile to ask what kinds of policies and exchange rate
arrangements might make emerging markets less vulnerable to sudden
stops in capital flows. The magnitude of capital flow reversals, the
substantial evidence that financial sector problems have deepened and
lengthened these crises, and the limited effectiveness of capital
controls provide the basis for reassessing the relative merits of fixed
and flexible exchange rate policies. Dollarization may offer emerging
market economies a viable and more market-friendly alternative to
capital controls.
Sudden stops
Unlike their developed country counterparts, emerging market
economies routinely lose access to international capital markets
during crises. Their reliance on short-term debt financing also means
that their public and private sectors are asked to repay existing debts
on short notice. The problem is compounded by the fact that their
debts are usually denominated in a foreign currency. Abrupt reversals,
or sudden stops, of capital inflows can push a country into insolvency
or drastically lower the productivity of existing capital stock,
resulting in large unexpected swings in relative prices and costly
bankruptcy battles.
Once a crisis has erupted and access to international capital markets
has been lost, the policy options available to emerging market
economies are severely restricted. Expansionary policies, which could
offset some of the devastating effects of capital flow reversals, are
possible only under capital controls—an unappealing option for many
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countries hesitant to reverse the process of financial liberalization or
accept the inflationary consequences often associated with such
policies.
Surges in capital inflows are often followed by sudden stops. With
few exceptions, these sudden stops are involuntary and associated
with a currency crisis and most often with a banking crisis as well. A
comparison of recent crises suggests that their severity has intensified
in the present decade. Until the recent Asian crisis, Latin America was
the region most prone to large-scale capital inflow reversals. But the
Thai crisis, which resulted in a 26 percentage point swing in private
capital flows (from inflows of about 18 percent of GDP in 1996 to
outflows of more than 8 percent in 1997), superseded the 20 percent
reversal in Argentina in the early 1980s. In terms of reserve losses
and the estimated costs of bailing out the banking sector, the severity
of the Asian crises surpassed that of their Latin American
counterparts in the 1990s, and represented a significant departure
from the region's historic norm.
Protracted banking crises
Sudden stops can trigger output collapses and severely damage
financial sectors. Nearly all the banking crises surveyed were
associated with a negative reversal in capital flows. The connection is
a crucial one, because banking crises have more lingering deleterious
effects on economic activity than currency crises, as is evident in the
respective impact of these crises on a range of indicators, including
output, imports, and bank deposits. Asset prices, for example,
typically take twice as long to recover after a banking sector crisis.
There are also likely to be important sectoral differences in the pace
of recovery. Following the devaluations that characterize most
currency crises, for instance, exports recover relatively quickly and
ahead of the rest of the economy. Following the onset of the banking
crises, however, exports continued to sink for nearly two years.
The protracted nature of banking crises is also evident in the average
number of months that elapse between the beginning and the height of
a crisis. Banking crises typically take a little over a year and a half to
reach their peak, and in some instances may take over four years.
Banking crises may also be protracted in the recognition and recovery
phases; the Japanese banking crisis, which has spanned most of the
1990s and is ongoing, is a recent example of this sluggish
recognition/admission/resolution process.
Quite clearly, banking crises are contractionary and the resulting
recessions are protracted. Typically, three years following the
beginning of a banking crisis, the economy will still not have returned
to precrisis growth rates. Two reasons for the protracted recessions
after banking crises are collapses in asset prices, which usually
accompany the crises and give rise to significant negative wealth
effects and depress consumer spending, and credit crunches, which
may lead to a severe contraction in investment.
Devaluations are frequently viewed as expansionary in industrial
countries, but recent currency crises in emerging market economies,
which include successful and unsuccessful speculative attacks,
highlight the staggering output losses associated with the capital flow
reversal problem. Two successful defenses of currencies in Argentina
and Hong Kong SAR and four successful attacks on the currencies of
Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and Thailand all produced the same result:
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an output collapse in the year following the sudden stop in capital
inflows that was about four times higher than the historic norm. Those
countries that devalued also found their output collapse compounded
by deep and costly banking crises, which also represented a
significant departure from historic patterns.
Role for capital controls?
In principle, the volume and composition of capital inflows should
respond to the policy stance of recipient countries. In some instances,
domestic policies, such as capital controls, are explicitly designed to
shape the volume or composition of inflows; in others, the effects of
policies, such as sterilized intervention, are largely unintended. An
examination of the experiences of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Czech
Republic, and Malaysia in the 1990s yields several key findings:
Sterilized intervention increases the volume of total capital flows,
through short-term capital movements. Sterilized intervention
significantly alters the composition of capital flows, increasing the
share of short-term and portfolio flows. This may argue against "a soft
peg," as the capacity for sterilized intervention is limited or
nonexistent under a currency board arrangement.
Capital controls appear to alter the composition of capital flows. They
reduce the share of short-term and portfolio flows, while increasing
that of foreign direct investment.
Foreign interest rates appear to have a significant effect on both the
volume and the composition of flows. Specifically, total capital flows,
and especially portfolio flows, respond systematically to changes in
U.S. and Japanese interest rates.
Some caveats are in order, however. Taxes or reserve requirements
targeting short-term inflows do have a significant effect on the
maturity profile of the flows, but it is not clear whether these
measures simply encourage a substitution of domestic short-term for
foreign short-term debt. To the extent that domestic short-term debt is
also an implicit claim on central bank reserves, such a substitution
would not normally ameliorate the liquidity problems that arise during
a capital flow reversal.
If part of the general problem of the reversal is short-term debt, then
emerging market governments should adopt more conservative
debt-management strategies and lengthen debt maturities. A tax on all
short-term borrowing may be preferable to taxing foreign short-term
borrowing. But governments that pursue capital controls will have to
cast a wide net to cover all financial intermediaries and even
nonfinancial corporations, and countries that succeed in this task may
find themselves deeply immersed in central planning. At best,
therefore, capital controls offer a short-term response to capital
inflows or outflows.
Sterilized intervention policies during the capital inflow period should
be discouraged, because these open market operations typically place
more short-term debt in the hands of the private sector. In several
episodes, sterilization led central banks to complement the stock of
public sector debt with debt of their own, adding an important
quasi-fiscal dimension to a short-term debt problem. This would be no
major problem if central banks held sterilized reserves as a backup for
associated short-term obligations of central banks. In practice,
however, there is a strong temptation to use those reserves for other
purposes.
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To fix or not to fix . . .
Because all recent crises took place against a background of
soft-pegged exchange rates, many analysts have concluded that "the
peg did it." Clearly, if the exchange rate had been allowed to float
freely, some international reserve loss would have been prevented.
But in many crisis episodes, either the government or the private
sector, or both, had relatively large foreign-exchange-denominated
short-term debt obligations that far exceeded the stock of international
reserves. In those circumstances, balance of payments crises would
likely have taken place under more flexible exchange rate
arrangements as well as under fixed-rate arrangements.
At a deeper level, however, it could be argued that liability
dollarization is partly a result of pegging, magnified by the
overconfidence and moral hazard problems that pegging may bring
about. If the exchange rate were free to float, the argument goes,
domestic investors, especially those in the nontradable sector, would
shy away from foreign-exchange-denominated loans because they
would then face a larger currency risk than under a fixed rate. This
position may sound convincing, but it misses two important points:
most emerging market countries start from a situation of partial
dollarization (at the very least, liability dollarization) and they rarely
ignore exchange rate volatility completely.
These points reinforce each other. Partial dollarization increases the
cost of exchange rate volatility, which, in turn, induces the central
bank to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to prevent
fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate. In fact, as the cases of El
Salvador, the Philippines, and Venezuela attest, this "fear of floating"
may be so severe that the exchange rate spends long stretches of time
at a fixed level, making it observationally equivalent to a soft peg.
Fear of floating, however, also induces more liability dollarization,
creating a vicious circle from which it is very hard to exit.
In addition, fear of floating arises whenever domestic firms use
foreign raw materials. In this case, floating is less destructive than in
the previous example, but it can still cause financial difficulties in the
medium term. Fear of floating and the lack of discipline that underlies
fixed exchange rates may drive authorities to adopt additional control
measures, like dual exchange rates and controls on capital mobility.
Even when fear of floating does not lead to capital controls and
countries adopt "market-friendly" ways of stabilizing the exchange
rate through open market operations, such policies have significant
costs in terms of the interest rate and volatility associated with them
and their procyclical nature. Thus, contrary to the view that floating
provides authorities with an extra degree of freedom to guarantee a
market-friendly environment, the opposite may happen.
To be fair, defenders of floating exchange rates make other
arguments, notably that floating exchange rates make it less costly to
react to shocks that require a fall in relative domestic prices. Under
fixed rates, the latter requires a fall in nominal prices that may be
costly in terms of output and employment. But the exchange rate is
only one instrument, and price/wage stickiness is a multidimensional
issue. Devaluation is not a silver bullet; in practice, it is an exercise in
political compromise and will make no group in the economy totally
happy. And fiscal policy can serve as a substitute for devaluation. If
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the real exchange rate is overappreciated, for example, labor subsidies
can be put in place to repli-cate, in a more controlled way, the desired
real depreciation. What, then, is the great benefit of the float over the
fixed rate?
Finally, traditional theory teaches that the choice of a foreign
exchange regime ought to be a function of the nature of shocks. The
basic lesson is: If the shocks are mostly real, float; otherwise, fix. In
recent crisis episodes, though, the shocks have come notably through
the capital account and thus contain both real and nominal
components, making the choice of the exchange rate system on that
basis more difficult. In addition, while theory views shocks as fully
exogenous, all available evidence suggests credibility and reputation
are critical in determining how hard an emerging market economy is
hit by financial turmoil and, thus, how large the shocks will be.
Argentina's dollarization proposal is, in fact, an attempt to make
policymaking more credible and, thus, lower country risk
differentials.
From the perspective of the emerging market economy, dollarization
has traditionally been criticized because use of a foreign money may
entail loss of seigniorage and a situation in which the dollarized
country is left without a lender of last resort. But the emerging market
economy that pursues dollarization and the country whose currency is
used could share the seigniorage, as Argentina has proposed. And
under dollarization and such a seigniorage-sharing arrangement, a
large portion of international reserves could be used to provide
lender-of-last-resort services. This would, of course, require the
holding of a large enough stock of reserves or the creation of a
"stabilization fund" by foreign donors.
In summary, much of the glitter of flexible exchange rates disappears
upon closer examination. The extra degrees of freedom provided by
exchange rate flexibility are fallacious or can be achieved through
fiscal policy. Strong pegs like dollarization can help to reduce the
incidence of external shocks, especially those that filter through the
capital account. While full dollarization will not eliminate banking
sector problems, it may ameliorate them if it reduces the problems
that stem from currency and maturity mismatches, and it will do away
with speculative attacks on the currency.
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